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1.  Introduction 
Central to the discussion of economic prospects is the level of debt in major 
economies.  After the severe 2008 global financial crisis and resultant recession in one-
half of the economies of the world, deleveraging in the private sector was modest and 
balance-sheet expansion in the public sector was massive.  Indeed, over the long history 
considered by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), the step-up in public debt to nominal GDP 
was without precedent in a window not containing a global war.  Not only does the 
advanced-economy public debt buildup come on top of  near-record private debt levels, 
but it also comes alongside record and near-record external debt levels and, in many 
countries, massively underfunded old age pension and health programs.  Reinhart, 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2012) characterize the problem as a quadruple debt overhang. 
The main contribution of this paper is to lay out a complete menu of options for 
renormalizing the level of public debt relative to nominal activity in the long run, should 
governments eventually decide to do so.  In the first half dozen years after the 2007-
2008 crisis, the real debate has rightly been about how fast and for how long to let 
debt/GDP ratios rise, not about cutting them.  But a vision of longer-term options and 
issues is key to weighing alternative medium-term stabilization strategies. 
There are basically two categories of debt reduction strategies.  First, orthodox 
ones, the standard fare of officialdom, include enhancing growth, running primary 
budget surpluses, and privatizing government assets.  Second, there are heterodox 
polices, including restructuring debt contracts, generating unexpected inflation, taxing 
wealth, and repressing private finance.  Advanced countries have relied far more on 
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such approaches than many observers choose to remember. Given the high starting 
debt loads that many governments bear (including unfunded pension liabilities and 
implicit insurance of private debt), a portion of them will likely choose from both parts 
of the menu in the years to come.  In the event, there is ample precedent for orthodox 
and heterodox choices in the record of central government debt consolidations across 
22 advanced economies since the Napoleonic War. 
The choices are generally more generous and more diverse for debt that is 
governed by the domestic legal system (and therefore it is easier to manipulate the 
terms), owned by domestic residents (potentially making it easier for the state to 
impose its will should it wish to partially default), and is denominated in domestic 
currency (creating the option of partially defaulting in real terms through surprise 
inflation).  Throughout, we will highlight where these distinctions are important. 
The next section reviews debt dynamics in the window around the recent 
financial crisis through the lens of a longer historical perspective.  Our interpretation is 
that the increase in debt among the advanced economies was large, owed importantly 
to discretionary actions by governments, and put major economies in unfamiliar 
territory. The debt surge has been followed by efforts to gradually stabilize debt at a 
very high level, with an eye towards eventually maneuvering a long-term gradual exit 
from that seldom-travelled region.  We spend some time going through the history of 
the debt buildup, since its genesis and dynamics are germane to any ultimate resolution. 
The rest of the paper is organized along the menu of options, first considering 
the orthodox options that typically make up the core of programs of the International 
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Monetary Fund and their official confederates.  As discussed in section 3, the first and 
by far most favored option is to have the economy grow faster, in real terms, than the 
expected market real interest rate on debt.1     
To be sure, faster economic growth importantly contributed to scaling back debt 
loads after the three prior peaks in government debt loads in advanced economies over 
the past 2-1/4 centuries.  But those peaks were largely the byproduct of global military 
conflict.  As Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff (2012) discuss, in the peacetime that 
followed, economic growth was bolstered by the re-integration of military personnel 
into the civilian sector and the application of technologies developed during the war. 
This time around, debt is the legacy of a global financial crisis, counseling caution in 
assuming that global economic expansion will pick up for the reasons emphasized by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).2    
We explore two possibilities why the interest rate on government debt might be 
pulled down rather than the growth rate of an economy pushed up outside a post-
conflict window.  One argument, based on the Barro-Rietz model, argues that both 
consumers and the government are legitimately concerned about preparing for the 
outside risk of subsequent catastrophes, such as military conflicts, pandemics and 
                                                      
1 We emphasize “expected” especially to distinguish cases where the trend equilibrium real interest rate 
is low from cases where the government is able to temporarily reduce the real interest rate through high 
rapid inflation.   We emphasize “market” because in practice, highly indebted governments often institute 
a web of financial market controls and restrictions which, through accident or design, can have the effect 
of dramatically lowering effective interest rates paid on government debt, as Reinhart and Sbrancia 
(2014) have forcefully argued. 
2 There are many reasons why growth may be slow after a financial crisis, not least due to private-sector 
deleveraging.  Frieden (2014) argues that debt crises naturally breed political discord as various parties 
struggle over which groups should bear the burden of the deadweight losses that financial crises generally 
entail.  Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2010) find empirically that political fragmentation increases after a financial 
crisis.  
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financial crises.  A second possibility is that governments repress private domestic 
finance to hold down the interest rate on government debt.  If so, this is a wealth tax, 
not an r < g bonanza. 
As discussed in the fourth section of the paper, high debt loads can be pared 
back by actively running primary surpluses.  Following Keynes, the surplus option is 
often polemically referred to as “austerity”.  (Indeed, even policies to gradually reduce 
budget deficits are nowadays often referred to as austerity.)  At one extreme, Alesina 
and Ardagna (2009) argue that if the initial condition features a large, overweening 
government, then a government contraction emphasizing spending cuts, as opposed to 
tax hikes, may be expansionary.  At the other extreme, DeLong and Summers (2012) 
argue that in a depressed economy, austerity is so inimical to growth, and cuts tax 
revenues so much (because of high fiscal multipliers and prolonged hysteresis), that it 
can lead to greater, not smaller, budget deficits.  A middle ground, of course, is for the 
government to reign in large deficits slowly over many years after a crisis, with greater 
leeway allowed for debt used to finance productivity-enhancing investments in 
education and infrastructure. 
As discussed in section 5, privatization, or selling government assets, generates 
cash that is especially useful for an economy with short-term liquidity problems.  
However, unless the private sector is more efficient than the public sector at providing 
the service being privatized, selling public assets has no first-order effect on the 
government’s long-term budget constraint. If sold at too low a price, the effect may 
even be negative.   
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We then turn to more heterodox policies that are often relied upon by nations in 
practice, but almost invariably frowned upon by transnational official institutions.  They 
include restructuring debt, eroding it in real terms through unexpected inflation, or 
keeping its real cost low through financial repression.   
To start, section 6 considers the possibility of debt restructuring and outright 
default.  The chief reminder is that this is not the exclusive purview of emerging market 
economies.  As Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) point out, before World War II, the outright 
write-down of debt in advanced countries was common and consequential.  Debt 
restructuring and default more commonly hit external debt because the “softer” options 
of inflation and financial repression are not available.  Even so, it sometimes occurred in 
the case of domestic debt with one notable episode being the abrogation of the gold 
clause by the United States during the Great Depression (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). 
In the seventh section of the paper, we briefly consider unanticipated inflation as 
a form of de facto default, as was practiced writ large by countries such as Japan and 
France at the end of WWII.  It was also a prominent feature across advanced countries 
during the 1970s, albeit on a lesser scale because debts were lower and inflation more 
moderate. 
Next on the menu are wealth taxes, which Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) list as 
one possible endgame to advanced-country debt buildups; Eichengreen (1990) explores 
efforts by European governments to institute lump-sum wealth levies in the aftermath 
of World Wars I and II, concluding that the efforts were undermined by political 
pressures and capital flight.   We focus particularly on financial repression, which should 
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be interpreted as a form of wealth tax more directly targeted at government debt 
holders.  We argue that financial repression may be one of the major reasons why  r−g 
remained so negative after WWII, as Reinhart and Sbrancia (2014) discuss in great 
detail.   
With that past as prologue, the conclusion ties together these threads.  
2.  Recent debt dynamics in a longer-term perspective 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, financial headlines grabbed 
attention with news of a massive expansion of government debt. The combination of 
government absorption of private mistakes, poorly performing economies that crushed 
revenue and raised nondiscretionary expenditures, and stimulus programs ballooned 
borrowing in much the way of prior crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, chapter 13).  
Equally attention-grabbing were subsequent reports of austerity programs in many 
countries intended to slow the speed of the debt buildup.   
We proceed to review debt dynamics over the past seven years across a 
collection of countries from the historical perspective provided by our prior work.  But 
two notes are necessary about the design of this discussion. 
First, in part of this section we report summary statistics for countries and 
selected regions.  That is, our unit of observation is a macro indicator for one country (or 
region) in a given year.  We do not roll up to the global level or weigh the observations 
by their GDP footprint.  This follows because the economic phenomena interesting to 
us—how governments behave around a financial crisis and in response to high debt—
work at the national level or in sub-aggregates of economies that are similar.  
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Aggregation is more appropriate for different questions, mostly related to how global 
markets clear.  Working with country-years raises the possibility that Simpson’s paradox 
(that disaggregated data yield different results than the same data aggregated) may 
arise.  To us, that is because such aggregation obscures within-country dynamics and 
yields a mistaken answer to the question posed. Our preferred approach of country-
weighting is, of course, the normal one in applications of this type, though others may 
be considered. 
Second, throughout this paper we mostly use data from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), including its long history of public debt (IMF, 2013).3  Our earlier 
work employs a public debt dataset of our own construction, as documented in 
considerable detail in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009), which gives the key archival 
sources.  The Reinhart-Rogoff dataset was in turn posted online and illustrated in 
Reinhart (2010).  By and large, the later IMF work (including the first installment: IMF, 
2010) follows the original sources we cited and matches up fairly closely with our 
dataset.  The reality is that building such a dataset from many different original sources 
of varied quality involves numerous judgment calls, and of course may be subject to 
future re-evaluations. 
The two panels of Figure 1 review the path of the general government balance 
(the bars) and its accumulation of gross public debt (the lines) for advanced and 
emerging-market economies, relative to nominal GDP.  Both sets of scales span the 
same range, making it evident that the fiscal response to the crisis was an advanced-
                                                      
3 Besides the Historical Public Debt Database, two additional IMF sources are the World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) and Fiscal Monitor (FM).   
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economy drama.  Those were the nations with large financial centers, overextended 
private debt, and an enormous stock of wealth on paper that evaporated.  Compared to 
emerging-market economies, the advanced economies have a more highly geared 
system of automatic stabilizers and a greater propensity to be active with their 
discretionary policy levers.  The consequence was a 30 percentage point increase in 
gross debt to nominal GDP, pushing that ratio above 105 percent. 
Emerging-market economies, in contrast, were not as dependent on financial 
activity.  Those in the group that did fall into recession were mostly taken down by the 
problems of their trading partners.  In fact, public debt only edged higher from a much 
lower starting point.4  That debt accumulates during a recession and an initially hesitant 
recovery is not surprising.  After all, the logic of intertemporal smoothing of 
consumption is to run down assets or borrow when income falls temporarily below its 
longer-run prospects. 
  
                                                      
4 That said, Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) demonstrate that emerging-market economies 
typically run into problems at lower public debt levels than do advanced economies. 
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Figure 1 
General government budget balances and gross public debt 
relative to nominal GDP, percent 
 
 
Source:  IMF, World Economic Outlook (10/14). 
 
 
Not all of the fallout from a severe financial crisis, however, is temporary.  As 
Reinhart and Reinhart (2011) document across the worst financial crises of the second 
half of the 20th century, ten years after a crash, the median level of real GDP per capita 
is 15 percent below the trend predicted from the ten years prior to the crash.  As shown 
in Figure 2 for the most recent episode, in 2014 the IMF staff lowered its assessment of 
potential output growth in advanced economies compared to four years earlier.   The 
right two columns of the table give the forecasts in the WEO for potential output growth 
in 2014 made in October 2010 and October 2014 for the Group of Seven countries.  The 
growth of aggregate supply is never observed, but the latter (2014) estimate 
presumably comes closer to the truth, at least as IMF staff now understand it.  In six of 
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the seven nations, the IMF marked down the rate of growth of potential output over the 
four-year window, with declines of about ½ percentage point or more in Italy, and 
Japan.5  The one country where the IMF’s assessment of growth prospects improved, 
Germany, is also the only one where gross public debt to GDP fell. Debt taken on when 
there were heady expectations of the expansion of aggregate supply would be more 
burdensome when prospects are marked down unexpectedly.  Add to that some 
unexpected disinflation and the real burden of the debt is more considerable still.   
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Gross public debt (relative to GDP) and estimates of potential output growth 
Gross public debt Potential output growth in 2014 
to nominal GDP, percent 
in the IMF World Economic Outlook, 
percent 
Forecast vintage as of: 
Country 2010 2014 Oct-10 Oct-14 
Canada 84.6 88.1 1.94 1.87
France 80.8 95.2 1.30 1.04
Germany 82.5 75.5 1.16 1.50
Italy 119.3 136.7 0.70 -0.10
Japan 216.0 245.1 0.82 0.36
United Kingdom 78.5 92.0 2.03 1.73
United States 94.8 105.6 2.12 1.90
Source:  IMF, Fiscal Monitor (10/14) and World Economic Outlook (various). 
 
Instructive in understanding debt dynamics is the observation that a significant 
portion of widening budget deficits and their subsequent partial reversal owed to policy 
                                                      
5 Most purely statistical techniques for estimating potential output would automatically mark it lower 
after a cyclical downturn, even if it were in fact exogenous.  However, the IMF staff does not exclusively 
rely on a statistical filter to estimate potential output. 
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decisions rather than the business cycle.  The two panels of Figure 3 look at the changes 
in actual general government budget balances (the horizontal axes) and their 
discretionary component (the vertical axes) using the sample of advanced economies 
available in the IMF Fiscal Monitor.6  The left panel plots the changes in these concepts 
from 2007 to 2010, and the right pairs changes from 2010 to 2013. 
Figure 3     
Advanced economies:  Change in actual and discretionary component of the     
 general government budget balance     
relative to nominal GDP, percentage points               
 
  
 
                    
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
Source:  IMF Fiscal Monitor (10/14).                 
 
 
At least according to IMF staff, the deterioration in government budget balances 
was predominantly a decision by governments, with the exception of Ireland given its 
                                                      
6 We use a chain rule to split the IMF estimates of actual, primary, and cyclically adjusted primary budget 
balances to identify the discretionary, cyclical, and interest-rate components of the budget.  An 
explanation and the data for the 30 advanced economies plotted in the chart are given in  Appendix A. 
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marked depression in activity.  Omitting Ireland, the simple regression between the two 
budget concepts shown in the inset suggests that budgets overall deteriorated 2.25 
percentage points of GDP because of cyclical weakening across all countries and one-
for-one with discretionary action within countries.7  We emphasize the distinction 
between discretionary and cyclical sources of the deficit because it is potentially 
important for understanding options to stabilize growing debt ratios.  As the figure 
illustrates, the discretionary component was quite important in many cases. 
The improvement from 2010 to 2013 follows the same script, with Ireland once 
again proving the exception.  The changes are more heterogeneous, in that a simple 
regression explains less of the variation and has no role for a common contributory 
change in budget balances.  Note that seven-tenths of discretionary changes pass 
through to budget balances in contradistinction to DeLong and Summers’ (2012) result 
that, in theory at least, the pass-through might have been much smaller or even 
negative. 
As we have already noted, there is little disagreement about the appropriateness 
of governments using fiscal policy to buffer the economic dislocations of the financial 
crisis.  There is far more controversy about the consequences of later decisions to 
reverse budget deficits gradually.  One line of thought is that in doing the latter, officials 
were leaving money on the table, especially given that borrowing costs were 
exceptionally low.  Another possibility is that officials were considering more margins 
(such as risk management) or a longer horizon when considering the marginal costs and 
                                                      
7 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) note that, historically, the most important driver of large post-crisis debt 
buildups is the depth of the recession, not the strength of countercyclical policy. 
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benefits of allowing high debt to expand even faster.  This is not to say that the 
calibration in any given country was optimal after the financial crisis, nor does it fully 
explain why governments were apparently so reluctant to spend more on high-return 
infrastructure projects that, over the long run, would likely raise output enough to lower 
long-run debt-to-GDP ratios. 
Striking to us is that governments tend to avoid prolonged stretches of high debt 
relative to GDP across countries and over periods of time (a point emphasized in 
Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff, 2012).  What some see as a missed opportunity might be 
a respect for precedent.  In that regard, the cumulative density function in the upper 
panel of Figure 4 sorts the observations on advanced economies in the IMF historical 
database by the frequency of the debt-to-GDP ratio.8  Economies stayed under a ratio of 
100 percent, around the current reading for the advanced-economy aggregate, 83 
percent of the time.  Even that may understate the aversion to high debt in the political 
economy, as observing country-years admits the possibility that the results are driven by 
long spells in a few countries.   
  
                                                      
8 The country set is the same as in the Fiscal Monitor as listed in the appendix table.  As previously 
explained, for this paper we are uncritical users of the IMF historical database, but in other work we start 
our sample in 1800.  The first century of observations in the IMF database, the 1700s, are mostly provided 
by the UK. 
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Figure 4 
Advanced economies:  Gross public debt to GDP 
 
 
 
 
Source:  IMF Historical Public Debt Database (2013). 
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Indeed, as we have emphasized in earlier work (e.g., Reinhart, Rogoff and 
Savastano (2003) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)),  country-specific factors – including 
history, institutions, the level of private and external debt as well as unfunded pension 
liabilities – are absolutely central to understanding any country’s tolerance for carrying 
high public debt.  Nevertheless, given that high-debt spells are relatively rare, it is 
important to consider cross-country data as well. 
The bottom panel plots selected percentiles (50th, 80th, and 95th) of the country 
distributions, which underscores the aversion to sustained high-debt levels revealed by 
the sample.  The shallow dashed line sorts the 95th percentile readings across the time 
series of 30 countries.  It shows that 53 percent of the sample had a 95th percentile 
reading of a 100 percent debt-to-GDP ratio.  Put the other way, 47 percent of the 
sample had the government willing to tolerate that debt ratio or higher 5 percent of the 
time.9  Sustaining such a long stretch is increasingly unlikely.  About 27 percent of the 
countries kept their debt ratio at 100 percent or higher for 20 percent of the time (the 
dashed line).  Only 3 percent of the sample (one country, the UK) held the ratio that 
high for 50 percent of the time (the solid line).  The Netherlands also posted a high debt 
ratio for much of the pre–Great War sample.   
Empires are exceptional for many reasons, as emphasized in Reinhart, Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2012).  For one, over much of their history, they enjoyed massive net 
revenues from abroad; in that sense, the right denominator for the UK and the 
Netherlands in the 19th and early 20th centuries would include some proportion of 
                                                      
9 Read the difference between the c.d.f and 100 percent as the share of countries living with high debt 
with the frequency given by the relevant percentile.  
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empire income.  On the theory side, Lucas (1990) provides an elegant example of how 
scale might be another important return to an imperial power.  As for revealed 
preference, the wars of the era showed that they and other powers assigned great 
economic and strategic value to colonial assets, so much so that the UK was engaged in 
military action during  nine-tenths of the 1800s.10  The empirical evidence on direct 
returns to empire, narrowly construed, are somewhat more mixed.  The returns 
estimated to the UK from its empire range from normal (Davis and Huttenback, 1988) to 
high Edelstein (1981).  Madison (1989) judges that 15 to 20 percent of Indonesian net 
domestic product went to Europeans (primarily the Dutch colonial power) in the 19th 
century. 
With the age of empires behind them, current officials seem to be following in 
the footsteps of their predecessors.  Governments tolerated high debt loads at a time of 
national duress but took steps to extricate themselves subsequently.  Perhaps this just 
means that officials are replicating the timidity of earlier generations, or there may be 
others forces at work.  Of course, it is possible and likely that debt tolerance has evolved 
over time, for example in response to financial globalization (see, for example 
Azzimonti, de Francisco and Quadrini, 2014).  On the other hand, unfunded pension 
liabilities and government guarantees implicit in secularly rising private debt may have 
lowered public debt tolerance (see, for example, Arcand, Berkes and Panizza, 2012).  
Importantly, we note that Figure 4 does not take into account the maturity structure of 
                                                      
10 See the data in “Correlates of War” at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. Accessed on August 20, 2014. 
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public debt, which is of course an important factor is assessing vulnerabilities, as Rodrik 
and Velasco (1999) among others have emphasized.   
We will now proceed to analyze this critical issue in greater detail by discussing 
seven approaches to debt reduction in turn:  growth, austerity, privatization, 
restructuring or default, unanticipated inflation, wealth taxes, and financial repression. 
3.  The favorite item on the menu:  Growth above the interest rate 
Many scholars, including Barro (1979), Ball and Mankiw (1995), and Bohn (2008) 
have noted that in practice, some advanced-country governments, most notably the 
United States, have been able to pay down a substantial portion of their debt by 
opportunistically exploiting the differential between the interest rate on government 
debt and the growth rate of the economy.  They largely treat this issue as a puzzle and a 
trap.  They caution that a government running a debt-Ponzi scheme when r < g might be 
subsequently faced with a sudden interest rate rise, necessitating a sharp and painful 
fiscal contraction.   
It is convenient to break the problem into two parts.  First, is it possible to raise 
growth to solve a debt problem?  Alternatively, can the government simply rely on a 
very low interest rate to help facilitate the reduction in its debt-to-income ratio, even if 
growth is only normal? We will devote considerable attention to the r versus g issue 
since it is often central to the claim that advanced economies (small and large) are 
special. 
The expanding body of evidence on the relationship between debt and growth, 
surveyed in Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff (2012), establishes that, on average, the 
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growth of real GDP at very high levels of debt is below that at low levels of debt. 11    In 
the event, virtually all the evidence is consistent with Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010a, b) 
original conjecture:  In the upper tail of debt/GDP ratios, the average rate of growth is 
lower than in more normal times.12  This does not mean that an economy with high debt 
cannot engage in structural reforms to substantially enhance growth.  Nor does it mean 
that a highly indebted country should eschew high-return infrastructure projects that 
might raise debt in the short run but lower debt-to-income ratios in the long run.  It 
does inject a note of caution that the track record of how countries have grown with 
high debt is very mixed.   And as a policy issue, it leaves one to wonder why growth-
enhancing measures were left on the table to be picked up when pressed by high debt 
loads. 
The period immediately following WWII deserves special comment, since that 
war also marks the biggest global debt buildup since the Napoleonic Wars.  As already 
noted in the introduction, growth performance after a war is bolstered by a number of 
special factors.  These include the depth of output declines during the war (so that 
output is growing from a lower base in many cases), postwar demobilization of troops 
(implying a particularly rapid growth in the labor force), the arbitrage of bringing 
wartime military inventions into civilian use, and in the case of war-torn Europe and 
Japan, very high returns to investment in physical capital, especially given high levels of 
human capital.  WWII followed on the tail of the Great Depression, when financial 
                                                      
11  For a discussion of earlier literature on debt and growth, see Checherita and Rother (2012). 
12   A reader of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b) would understand that a difference in averages in no way 
implies that a threshold is necessarily sharp. 
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duress and weak growth likely slowed the pace at which basic scientific inventions were 
put to work in the civilian economy.  Indeed, historians of productivity growth have long 
noted these factors were likely quite important in explaining why productivity generally 
began to slow in advanced countries during the 1970s and 1980s compared to the 1950s 
and 1960s (see Ferguson and Wascher, 2004).  Even considering all these factors, the 
debt and growth literature still finds that high debt is not positively associated with high 
growth, and many studies find the opposite. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b) note that comparisons between central 
government debt at the end of WWII and after the recent financial crisis miss an 
important feature of the rest of the economy.  In current circumstances, total debt is far 
higher, both because of much higher state and local debt, and because of a massive 
inflation of private-sector debt.13   In 1946, public debt stood at 116 percent of nominal 
GDP.  Private debt amounted to only another 45 percent, about half of which was in the 
nonfinancial sector.  Essentially, fifteen years of depression and global conflict ground 
private credit to a halt.  Subsequent scaling back by the US government allowed an easy 
rotation to a private sector eager to borrow.  Not so now.  Households, firms, and 
intermediaries have pushed private debt to well above that of the general government. 
As Reinhart and Sbrancia (2014) argue and will be discussed in more detail later, 
exceptionally negative ex-post real interest rates, rather than exceptionally high growth, 
were a key factor in explaining how governments worked their debt down after WWII.  
                                                      
13 This draws on Buttiglione, Lane, Reichlin, and Reinhart (2014), which illustrates the massive overall 
leverage remaining in the global economy after the crisis and discusses policies for stabilizing public and 
private debt levels. 
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Indeed, they find that if the US and UK had been paying even zero real interest rates (far 
below the growth rates their economies experienced), their debt-to-GDP levels would 
not have plunged in the ten years after 1945 as they in fact did.    
Financial repression might be associated with lower government borrowing rates 
through two distinct mechanisms.  First, increased regulation and restriction on finance 
raises the cost of private-sector intermediation.  The resultant higher intermediation 
spreads imply a lower market rate is required to generate the same level of aggregate 
demand as previously.  Second, if financial repression operates as a tax that impedes 
growth, or facilitates a higher public debt level, crowding out private capital, then real 
growth in the steady state will be lower than otherwise.  By the canonical consumption-
smoothing equation, a lower rate of growth would be associated with a lower real 
short-term interest rate.14 
A nuanced consideration of the consumption decision is worth exploring to see 
what other explanations there are for the exceptionally low and negative real interest 
rates on government debt that were so important in bringing down postwar debt.  In 
particular, the fear of rare disasters (à la Barro, 2006, and Rietz, 1988) might explain 
both households’ willingness to accept low interest rates and the government’s 
preference for low debt levels.  Barro (2006) shows that the outside risk of a very large 
fall in consumption due to war, epidemic, or other catastrophe can help substantially 
solve the Mehra-Prescott (1985) equity premium puzzle.   
                                                      
14 Indeed, if households are risk averse, then a reduction in growth produces a more-than-proportional 
decline in the real rate. 
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Much of the action in Barro’s parameterization comes not from a rise in the 
required return on equity, but from a fall in the risk-free interest rate.  Where the 
canonical stochastic growth model with power utility shows a risk-free real interest rate 
of over 3 percent for the standard parameter choices for risk, growth, and the variance 
of consumption (see, for example Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, Ch. 5), Barro finds that by 
introducing rare consumption disasters, the real interest rate falls to 1 percent.  Barro 
calibrates his model by looking at the frequency of large output falls (15 percent or 
more) over a relatively short period, across 20 advanced economies.  He finds the odds 
of a disaster are about 1.7 percent per year.15   
Barro does not, however, consider at length whether rare disasters are likely to 
make the real interest rate negative (though he notes the possibility). Here we explore 
that idea in more detail.  Of particular interest is the post-WWII period where, as we 
document in section 7, maturity-weighted average real interest rates paid on 
government debt were often significantly negative.  The basic point can be expressed in 
the simplest version of Barro’s model, which is the same as Mehra-Prescott (1985) with 
time-separable utility and constant relative-risk-aversion preferences.  Exogenous 
output follows a constant trend, subject to both the standard log-normally distributed 
shocks and a unit-root “rare disaster shock” that follows a Poisson process.  When a rare 
disaster occurs, there is a permanent one-time drop in the level (but not in the trend 
                                                      
15 In later work (Barro and Ursua, 2012), he extends the scope of his dataset, incorporates data on 
consumption in addition to output (since it is consumption drops that enter utility), and uses a less strict 
definition of disaster (10% instead of 15%). This produces the odds of an output disaster of 3.5% and of a 
consumption disaster of 3.7%. We note that there is a considerable further literature on rare disasters 
and macroeconomics including for example Wachter (2013), who explicitly allows for time-varying 
disaster risk, an extension that is clearly quite relevant to our discussion here.  
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growth rate) of output.  The rare-disaster shock is asymmetric in that it is only a 
downside risk.   The resulting formula for the “risk free” real interest rate is given by 
 
 
(see Barro, 2006, equation 12), where r is the “risk free” interest rate, θ is the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion, σ is the variance of the (log-normally distributed i.i.d.) growth 
shock, ρ is the rate of time preference, γ is the trend (deterministic) growth rate, b is the 
permanent downward shift in output when a rare disaster occurs, p is probability of a 
rare disaster, and q allows for the possibility of a haircut on “riskless” bonds in the event 
of a rare disaster.  Empirically, haircuts on bonds are particularly important after wars 
(through default and inflation) although they are still very much a hedge against rare 
disasters overall.  
Barro (2006) imputes the probability p of rare disaster as 0.017, with the other 
parameters in equation (1) being q = 0.4, θ = 4, ρ =0.03, γ = 0.025.  The mean of b is 
taken to be 0.29, though to calculate the coefficient on p in equation (1) of course 
requires knowing the full distribution of disaster outcomes, since the term [(1 − q)∙E(1 − 
b)–θ + q∙E(1 − b)1–θ + q∙Eb −1] is highly nonlinear.  (The expectation operator on the right-
hand side of eq (1) is conditional on the occurrence of a rare disaster.)   Given these 
parameters and Barro’s estimates of the historical distribution of b, the coefficient on p 
in eq (1)  is − 5.3, and the expected real interest rate (net of losses from default) r is 
0.035 (Table V, column 2, in Barro, 2006). Given that the coefficient on the rare disaster 
probability p is −5.3, raising probability p from the baseline of 0.017 to 0.025, the 
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expected real interest rate then falls to −0.007  [=  0.035 − 5.3(0.008)]  (Table V, column 
4, in Barro, 2006).  Doubling p to 0.034 would lower the expected real interest rate to 
--0.055 [= 0.035 – 5.3(0.017)].   
These calculations, of course, assume that the distribution of b does not change 
as the probability of a rare disaster rises, and that the effect on the level of output is 
permanent.  However, later work has allowed more general utility functions (Barro, 
2009), time-varying disaster probabilities (Gabaix, 2012), and a richer version of the 
disaster shocks.  In an appendix, we illustrate calculations of the sensitivity of the 
interest rate to the probability of rare disaster using Barro’s (2009) generalized recursive 
utility model where the coefficient of relative risk aversion is not constrained to equal 
the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.  We also use the extended 
disaster probability distribution results from Barro and Ursua (2012) where they allow 
for a weaker threshold of a 10% output drop for rare disasters.  The effect of changes in 
p on r falls somewhat (to between −1.54 and −3.26 instead of −5.3), but the basic 
qualitative point is robust: small variations in the disaster probability can generate a 
very large change in the real interest rate. 
Mehra and Prescott (1988) expressed skepticism when Rietz (1988) first 
suggested rare disasters as an explanation for low real interest rates, arguing that 
expectations of outside events are too volatile and would imply a correspondingly 
volatile real interest rate.   They suggest that events such as resolution of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis in 1962 should have had a huge impact on interest rates according to the 
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Rietz model.16  Barro (2006) suggested that this is not necessarily the case because wars 
have very different implications for the riskless interest rate than do other kinds of 
catastrophes such as recessions, because defaults on government debt (either through 
outright default or high inflation) are much more common during wars.  In fact, in the 
cross-country historical sample, the loss rate on bonds and stocks is roughly similar, 
whereas during depressions bonds have proven a much better hedge.   Arguably, since 
banking crises and pandemics by nature tend to occur quite unexpectedly, the process 
governing expectations of these events may be considerably more stable. 
The generation that experienced the Great Depression attached a significant 
weight to a recurrence for a very long time.  In the years after WWII, savers and 
investors might well have long remembered that the boom that followed WWI was 
followed a decade later by a depression.  The idea that fears of catastrophe might help 
explain low real interest rates after the Great Depression was already noted by 
Nordhaus (1974, p. 200).17   Given the experience of WWI, the influenza pandemic of 
1918-19, the Great Depression, WWII – not to mention the deep recessions a number of 
countries including the UK and Sweden experienced in the early 1920s -- it would not be 
hard to believe that individuals in the post-WWII period had a particularly heightened 
                                                      
16  More recently, Julliard and Ghosh (2012) argue that the rare events explanation of the equity premium 
puzzle creates too much correlation across returns on different equities. 
17 See Nordhaus (1974, p. 200).  He writes:  “What explains the dramatic fall in the cost of capital? The 
answer seems to me to lie in the general economic climate and in the gradual dissipation of the fear of a 
new Great Depression. For many years after the crash, investors justifiably worried about a repetition of 
those events. Even as late as March 1955, when the fear might reasonably have faded, the statement by 
Professor Galbraith that the Great Crash could repeat itself was sufficient to send the market into a 
temporary panic—or so he claims.”  Nordhaus’s footnote 21 cites John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great 
Crash, 1929 (2d ed., Houghton Mifflin, 1961). 
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fear of tail risks.  Indeed, a number of crisis indicators suggest the postwar period was 
risky, albeit not as uniquely risky as the foregoing discussion might imply; see for 
example the estimates in Wachter (2013). 18 
To the extent that r is much lower than g because of fear of a catastrophic event 
that affects an entire economy, it does not necessarily follow that the government 
should just passively let the debt/GDP level run down during normal times without ever 
running a primary surplus.  Assuming the government has the same assessment of 
catastrophe risk as the public, and since it will likely need to borrow massively in crisis 
(certainly in a financial crisis or a war), then there is every reason to want to steer debt 
back towards lower levels so as to avoid the risk of facing borrowing difficulties at 
precisely the moment where the value of being able to borrow is highest. 
Other explanations that do not fit as neatly into the Barro–Rietz paradigm 
include changing portfolio characteristics of debt, a growing inequality in rich countries 
that created a greater pool of resources in high-saving wealthy individuals versus credit-
constrained poorer individuals, an anticipated slowing in trend global growth, and an 
aging global population. (See the IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2014, chapter 4, 
for a suggestive breakdown of the different effects.)  Certainly, one can imagine some of 
the same effects going on during the post-WWII period.  However, even if growth in the 
decades after WWII was unspectacular compared to the potential growth rate, it was 
                                                      
18 We should also note that the general idea that catastrophic events may long influence investor and 
market behavior is consistent with broader theories, for example Zhang, Brennan and Lo (2014), who  
argue that major catastrophic events can have a significant effect on risk aversion. 
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hardly a slow-growth period.  And contrary to today’s slowing population growth, there 
was a population boom. 
On net, the equilibrium market interest rate may have been lower than usual in 
the manner suggested by the rare disaster literature.  However, as we discuss later, 
other factors, including especially financial repression, may have been at least as 
important, if not more so, especially after World War II. More recently, high saving by 
emerging markets and aging advanced economies have also been important factors.19    
4. Primary budget surpluses 
A second class of options for dealing with high debt levels is to engage in active 
policies to return debt to normal levels.   Notwithstanding the apparent experience in 
Europe from 2010 to 2013, the empirical literature on debt finds that there is a positive 
correlation between the size of the primary surplus and the level of public debt relative 
to GDP.  In his classic paper, Bohn (1998) finds a strong and significant relationship in 
the United States using a long historical time series, even after controlling for business 
cycles and temporary government spending surges, for example due to wars. 20   
Barro (1979) argues that optimal debt management policy should aim to smooth 
tax distortions over time, in a fashion very similar to the permanent income hypothesis 
of consumption smoothing.  Holding government spending constant, it is optimal to run 
deficits during a recession and surpluses during an expansion when welfare could better 
withstand the distorting effects of higher tax rates.  During wars, governments run 
                                                      
19 For example, see Bernanke (2005) and Caballero (2006). In his extensive survey of the literature on 
fiscal sustainability, Tanner (2013) also concludes that the casual evidence suggesting governments can 
rely on r−g being negative absent financial repression is specious. 
20 See also Mendoza and Ostry (2008), Ghosh et al. (2011) and Mauro et al. (2013). 
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deficits because current government spending is far above its normal “permanent” 
level.  By the same logic, the government should also run surpluses during peacetime 
when government spending is low relative to its permanent value.  Importantly, the 
government would not necessarily run a surplus just because debt is high.   
Blanchard (1984) and Bohn (1998) point out that this simple rule has to be 
modified when there are limits to the share of GDP the government can raise as tax 
revenues.  In this case, high debt-to-GDP ratios enter the calculus independently 
through a precautionary savings motive.  More generally, we have already seen that 
empirically, even advanced-country governments cannot assume they always have 
access to markets no matter how high their debt levels (for example, the case of IMF 
bailouts of the UK and other advanced countries from the 1950s to the early 1980s).   
An important failing of the extant empirical literature is that, due to data 
limitations, it is difficult to fully take into account the larger debt picture in the 
economy, including off-balance-sheet obligations of the government and private debt, 
which may become a public responsibility at a time of stress.21  Obstfeld (2013) argues 
that the growing size of the financial systems reinforces the need for governments to 
observe fiscal prudence, so as to be able to credibly backstop them in the event of a 
crisis.    
Here, it is important to recall the decomposition of the budget change provided 
in Figure 3.  According to the regression line, budget balances relative to GDP from 2007 
to 2010 deteriorated one-for-one with discretionary acts, with another 2-1/4 
                                                      
21 This is why crises tend to occur as “twins”, in the terminology of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). 
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percentage point worsening attributable to other factors, presumably the financial crisis 
and the attendant recession.  That is, deficits were partly active decisions and those 
decisions were partly unwound from 2010 to 2013, when discretionary decisions 
contributed to 70 percent of the improvement in budgets relative to GDP, on average.  
Moreover, “austerity” is hardly a long-run trend, at least in the sense of a shrinking 
government.  As Figure 5 portrays, the footprint of government spending as a share of 
GDP for the advanced economies tracked by the IMF expanded from around 20 percent  
Figure 5 
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in the early 1950s to around 40 percent in the 2000s.    As a result, the recent downtick 
only reverses about one-third of the sharp increase associated with the immediate 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. 
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When a government has high debts, it may need to run primary surpluses either 
because it is forced by markets, or, as is more often the case of the richest advanced 
economies, because the government chooses to aim for a lower debt trajectory in order 
to maximally preserve its option to ramp up debt in a severe crisis.  The real debate 
surrounding austerity should center on timing and tactics.  
As already noted, DeLong and Summers (2012) argue that in some 
circumstances, particularly when the economy is in a liquidity trap, austerity can be self-
defeating and even likely to lead to higher deficits.  Their argument centers on 
hysteresis in employment effects.  When governments attempt to rein in debt during a 
period of weak employment, a greater number of workers become permanently 
estranged from the labor force, implying a fall in long-run trend output and in 
government revenues.22   
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) assert that if done in a way that features reductions 
in government spending rather than tax hikes, austerity can actually lead to higher 
growth at the same time as it sharply reduces deficits.  Their world is one where 
governments have become large, overweening and inefficient.  In this case, austerity 
measures to boost long-term efficiency portend a long-term fall in tax rates, thereby 
energizing investment and confidence.  To get the extreme result that contractionary 
fiscal policy might actually raise output, they implicitly allow for the fact that when a 
fiscally weak government tightens expenditure policy, it frees the central bank to follow 
                                                      
22 The DeLong-Summers analysis, of course, does not take into account Schumpeterian creative 
destruction that occurs during recessions that has positive hysteresis effects.  If the financial crisis itself 
ultimately traces to severe credit-boom–induced distortions, some restructuring is necessary in any event. 
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a looser and more expansionary monetary policy.  The IMF (2010) basically reaches the 
same conclusion, although it places greater emphasis on the key role of expansionary 
monetary policy in this process.  An important implication is that if an economy is in a 
liquidity trap, the case of expansionary fiscal consolidation may be significantly less 
plausible. 
The Alesina-Ardagna and DeLong-Summers analyses have some bearing on 
timing and strategy in a fiscal consolidation.   In successful Alesina-Ardagna–type fiscal 
consolidations, there is a virtuous feedback effect, so that as growth is enhanced, the 
reduction in debt is more than proportional.  In the DeLong-Summers example, austerity 
is self-defeating, and not only lowers the path of income but raises the path of debt.  
Presumably, in normal times, austerity does lead to a lower debt-to-income ratio, 
though perhaps not one for one.  Regardless, fiscal consolidations usually involve intra-
temporal, intertemporal and distributional tradeoffs and other active policies for 
bringing down debt. 
5. Privatization 
 Privatization of public assets, such as state-owned utility companies, land, etc. is 
often included in formal programs of official institutions with debt-strapped 
governments.  It is important, however, not to confuse potential efficiency gains from 
privatization with genuine improvements in the government’s long-run budget 
constraint.  If, say, the government runs a utility as efficiently as a regulated private-
sector monopoly would, then there are no efficiency gains.  Even if the government 
succeeds in getting a fair price for its asset, it loses in expected revenues whatever it 
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gains in short-term debt reduction.  Privatization can be quite useful as one tool for 
dealing with acute short-term liquidity problems, but unlike the other policies 
considered here it does not necessarily relax the government’s long-term budget 
constraint. 
This suggests that there are two possible channels for real consequences of 
privatization.  For one, the government may be a poor custodian of its assets, including 
the obvious possibility of corruption that may be part of our sample or waste associated 
with rent-seeking to find officials’ favor.  Moreover, officials are often limited in their 
ability to achieve the appropriate allocation of resources by binding procurement 
regulations and complicated labor rules.  That is, a government-run enterprise can be 
thought of as the combination of an efficiently run business less a regulatory burden to 
achieve other policy goals.  Selling the asset provides the opportunity to rethink those 
policies and arrive at a more efficient national outcome. 
A second possible channel is that privatization can enhance the liquidity of the 
government’s balance sheet by converting valuable but highly illiquid assets, thereby 
strengthening the government’s ability to withstand speculative debt attacks.  This is a 
legitimate question that requires further study. 
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6. Debt restructuring and default 
The history of sovereign default is dealt with in great detail in Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009), including both defaults on external debt (which they define as debt 
governed by foreign law) as well as domestic debt (debt governed by domestic law).  
For debt that is owed to foreigners, denominated in foreign currency, and 
adjudicated by foreign courts, the menu of options is far more limited than, say, for the 
case when debt is owed to domestic residents, indexed in domestic currency, and 
adjudicated by domestic law.  By contrast, for external foreign-currency debt, when a 
country loses market confidence, and where no international bailout is available, default 
and debt restructuring can become a country’s only option; it is not possible to inflate 
away foreign-currency debt by printing money. (Clearly, the issue is fundamentally the 
same for individual countries within the euro system.) 
Foreign courts are also far less inclined to do a country’s bidding.  If US debt in 
the 1930s had been adjudicated by British law, would courts have allowed abrogation of 
the gold clause? (The gold clause guaranteed US Treasury debt holders the option of 
being paid in gold at $20 per ounce instead of currency.)  Foreign creditors cannot be 
bullied the same way as domestic bondholders when, for example, regulations and 
restrictions are put in place that force residents to hold government debt at far below 
the rates they would command in an unfettered market.   
 When debt is foreign controlled and foreign-currency denominated, countries 
face a rollover risk.  With domestic debt, the central bank (or treasury as the case may 
be) can always print money to buy back maturing debt.  Because debt denominated in 
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domestic currency is far less vulnerable to rollover risk than foreign-currency debt, it 
generally affords countries a broader range of options, from adjusting primary balances, 
to relying on growth, to various forms of wealth taxes. 
Even though governments that issue debt in domestic currency can never be 
forced into technical default by markets, they are, of course, still vulnerable to inflation 
risk and to nominal interest rate spikes should inflation expectations become 
unanchored.  The naïve argument that inflation expectations can be perfectly anchored 
with inflation targeting without jeopardizing the central bank’s ability to deal with 
rollover risk is explored by Aguiar, Amador, Farhi and Gopinath (2013).  In fact, in their 
model, there is a tradeoff  between maintaining inflation credibility and eliminating 
rollover risk for domestic debt.  In the case where inflation targeting is too rigid, the 
country faces rollover risk because the central bank is not able to print money as 
needed to prevent a rollover crisis. In the case where there is no anti-inflation 
commitment, the country avoids rollover risks entirely, but is faced with a high, time-
consistent rate of inflation.   
Under the assumptions of their model, the optimal policy is to aim for an 
intermediate case where expected inflation is relatively low (although above the 
optimum with commitment), but with sufficient flexibility to eliminate rollover risk.   
Some have argued that in the special case of an economy in a liquidity trap, the tradeoff 
disappears, since, at the zero bound, the government can issue currency to soak up any 
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debt, without raising inflationary expectations.23  This argument is correct in the small 
but not necessarily in the large.  On the one hand, if the government’s anti-inflation 
commitment is strict, then a sufficiently large rollover problem will still force the central 
bank into a corner where it cannot continue providing liquidity without sacrificing its 
(assumed very strict) inflation commitment.  On the other hand, if the inflation 
commitment is not strict, then the currency is still vulnerable to jumps in inflation 
expectations when the private sector coalesces on solvency concerns.  Put differently, 
quantitative easing (QE) is not an unlimited check-writing option for dealing with a 
collapse in debt confidence unless the central bank is willing to risk a very sharp rise in 
inflation expectations.  
 Other than inflation, do advanced countries default?  Of course, as Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) show, many of today’s advanced countries once defaulted routinely on 
external debt in earlier historical eras, and a number of the combatant countries 
defaulted in WWII, notably Japan and Germany.  As Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) show, 
during the 1930s, there were also massive defaults on WWI debts owed to the United 
States government by the UK and France among others, and a number of 
Commonwealth countries defaulted on similar debts to the UK.  Although the political 
economy of these debts was arguably somewhat unique, and the defaults did not 
appear to dramatically impair the borrowers’ access to private markets (perhaps 
                                                      
23 See, for example, Krugman (2014), who notes that Chinese holdings of US debt are not large enough to 
cause a problem, though it is far from clear what broader reaction might accompany a large-scale foreign 
central bank sell-off. 
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because private debts were viewed as de facto senior), they nevertheless constitute 
very clear cases of default. 
 Qian et al. (2011) point out that while no advanced country has engaged in 
outright default between WWII and 2010, there were a number of close calls requiring 
IMF bailouts, notably of the UK in 1956, 1967 and 1976.  So even before Greece later 
defaulted during the Eurozone crisis, a number of advanced economies found 
themselves constrained by markets, in contrast with the glib assumption that “advanced 
countries do not default.” 24 
As advanced-country government debt and old age pension obligations continue 
to expand, and as inflation-targeting regimes become more rigid, it remains to be seen 
whether all advanced countries have permanently “graduated” from outright debt 
default, using the terminology of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
7. Unanticipated inflation 
As long as debt is denominated in domestic currency, then in principle inflation is 
always an option for substantially reducing debt.   The option of inflating away debt is, 
of course, sensitive to the maturity structure of the debt, the underlying institutions 
that affect price rigidities, and the speed at which monetary authorities can accelerate 
the prices of goods and services.  In the extreme event where all government debt is 
very short term, a government pursuing this option must generate a large sudden burst 
of inflation.  Otherwise, private agents will anticipate the inflation burst as they roll over 
                                                      
24 Of course, since 2010, Greece has defaulted on both public and private debts, several Eurozone 
countries have had their official debts restructured, and Cypress engaged in a restructuring that included 
a haircut for bank depositors. 
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maturing debt and demand a proportionately higher nominal interest rate to 
compensate.     
Even a very strong anti-inflation-targeting regime can break in the face of strong 
enough government-spending pressures.  Entering WWI, most of the industrialized 
world adhered to the gold standard, an approach that had preserved long-run global 
price stability for the greater part of five centuries.  But the exigencies of WWI induced 
countries to abandon the gold standard, while others engaged in highly inflationary 
macroeconomic policies.  Whether inflation can be an endgame to modern peacetime 
debt buildups is an open question, but it remains on the table.   Worrisomely, this is an 
option that would not be debated in public (thereby undercutting any benefits from its 
unexpected nature) but rather put into effect by central banks. 
8. Wealth taxes and financial repression 
As we have already noted, wealth taxes could be included in the full spectrum of 
tax policies that governments use to expand their primary surplus.  We treat them 
separately here only in that by issuing a significant lump-sum tax on the stock of wealth, 
governments can deleverage at a far faster rate than by taxing the flow of income.  The 
IMF Fiscal Monitor (October 2013) discusses the idea of implementing a 10% wealth tax 
in Europe as a mechanism for dealing with Europe’s overleveraged economies, although 
it reaches cautious conclusions.   
Financial repression, broadly defined, appears to be a far more commonly used, 
subtler, and quantitatively significant form of wealth taxation.  Contemporary 
discussions of dealing with debt seldom acknowledge that the widespread system of 
38 
 
financial repression that prevailed worldwide from 1945 to the early 1980s likely played 
an instrumental role in reducing or liquidating the massive stocks of debt accumulated 
in many of the advanced countries during WWII, the United States inclusive.   
Repression is the mechanism by which governments can enjoy differentials 
between the interest rate and the growth rate far in excess of what market-based risk 
considerations would justify.25  Even during the 1970s, when inflation clearly had a large 
unanticipated component (it certainly took much of the economics profession by 
surprise), financial restrictions, such as Regulation Q in the United States, likely had a 
significant role in slowing private-sector adjustment to high inflation.  This slow 
adjustment, in turn, allowed the government to pay far lower real interest rates than it 
might have had to do otherwise.   
Reinhart and Sbrancia (2014) developed a new detailed database on the 
characteristics and the composition of government debt for 12 countries over 1945–
2008. These data on the public debt portfolio reflect the actual shares of debts across 
maturities, as well as the shares of marketable versus nonmarketable debt (the latter 
involving both securitized debt as well as direct bank loans).  The comprehensive scope 
of the data allows them to quantify the role played by financial repression. 
Their year-by-year calculations measure the lessened real value of coupon and 
principal payments on debt owing to the cumulative toll of inflation.  That is, a burst of 
inflation lowers real payments over a horizon defined as long as the longest-maturity 
                                                      
25 Why use the term “repression,” which might be taken pejoratively?  In part, this is out of respect of the 
originators of the term, McKinnon and Shaw.  In part, it treats the language used by official institutions 
symmetrically.  For decades, emerging-market economies placing restrictions on capital flows or other 
financial market activity were deemed repressive.   
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outstanding security.  Apportioning the cost of inflation across the entire debt stock 
explains why the benefits of inflation stretch for so long (as opposed to the calculations 
in Hall and Sargent, 2010, for example).  Also, consistent with the computational model 
of Hilscher et al. (2014), unexpected inflation gains far more traction when teamed with 
financial repression. 
Figure 6 provides a snapshot of some of the evidence for a subset of the 
countries presented there.  The left bars provide information on those economies  
Figure 6 
Incidence and Magnitude of the Liquidation of Public Debt, 1945–1980 
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Source:  Reinhart and Sbrancia (2014). 
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Germany and Japan did).  Instead, they lowered debt loads in a slower grind by taxing 
government bond holdings.  The bars at the left graph the share of the years in the 
sample in which outstanding real levels of debt fell because of a negative return on that 
debt.   
The bars at the right plot the average negative real interest rate in those 
“liquidation” years.  As is evident, these advanced economies spent a considerable share 
of this postwar period eroding the real value of their outstanding debt, with negative 
real rates averaging more than 2 percent (in absolute value).  In France, about three-
quarters of the thirty-five years immediately following the war saw a steady drain on the 
wealth of bondholders, with the real rate averaging around 9 percent in those years, not 
much different in magnitude than the wealth tax that the IMF discussed so gingerly in 
2013. 
9. Historical perspective on debt reduction 
We have shown here and in earlier related research that in practice, advanced-
country governments have used a far wider variety of methods for bringing down high 
debt levels than is commonly remembered.  Heterodox methods such as debt 
restructuring, inflation, and financial repression have all been used on a large number of 
occasions.  Can advanced-country governments simply rely on growth in excess of the 
interest rate to painlessly bring down exceptionally high debt overhang over the long 
run?  The historical record is not necessarily kind to this view, as the mechanisms that 
create this wedge can sometimes raise risks and dampen growth. An important agenda 
for future research is to try to do an accounting of how debt has been brought down in 
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different historical episodes, apportioning debt reduction across the different categories 
on the debt-reduction menu.  Unfortunately, a comprehensive classification and 
breakdown is well beyond the scope of this paper.  We do note, however, that our 
dataset on historical debt/GDP ratios over the past 2¼ centuries shows dozens of 
advanced-country episodes where debt/GDP ratios have come down on a sustained 
basis, say by fifteen percent for over a period of five years.  Despite backdrops that were 
arguably more favorable than current circumstances, orthodox policies appear to have 
been insufficient in a significant proportion of the cases.   Much more work is needed, 
however, to develop a more finely-graded classification. 
 
10. Conclusion 
Fiscal policy has many complex effects on the economy, and as Barro (1997) 
emphasizes, it is not easy to reduce their effects to simple aggregate-demand analysis.  
What the government spends its resources on and how it chooses to tax are critically 
important issues.  It is misdirected to approach managing the primary balance absent a 
broader efficiency discussion on the costs and benefits of government spending and 
taxation.  And in any such comprehensive assessment higher moments that affect risk 
potentially have significant impacts on private and public behavior. 
Overall, the theoretical literature finds that there is cause for taking into account 
the effects of very high debt on the capital stock, growth, and risk.  Perhaps, the most 
important motivation for preserving prudent public debt levels is the one Obstfeld 
(2013) exposits:  governments are the last line of resort in many situations, and it is 
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important to maintain the option value of being able to issue sudden large bursts of 
debt in response to catastrophes (war, financial or otherwise). 
Officials act that way.  They do not lightly take on exceptionally high debt loads.  
If circumstances dictate otherwise, they typically try to stabilize the growth in debt as 
the opportunity permits, with the aim of bringing it down (relative to income) in the 
long run.  Examples include both the orthodox policies listed in every communique of 
the G-7 and G-20 and the heterodox ones amounting to wealth confiscation that have 
been often practiced in the past.  Indeed, the message from dozens of episodes of 
significant debt reductions in advanced economies since the Napoleonic War is that 
everything is on the table.   
Debt write-downs after the 2008 crisis could have been accomplished before 
private-sector mistakes were assumed by governments.  Now, they seem inevitable for 
some countries after that fact.  The most apt description of current circumstances 
comes from John Foster Dulles, writing in 1922 about Allied debts built up for a global 
event that, in retrospect, seems wasteful on a higher order even compared to the 
financial crisis of 2008.  Dulles explained that it was time “…to clear away paper debts 
and credits which can never be collected, but which, by their existence, constantly 
disturb the political and financial situation.”  (Dulles, 1922, p. 131) 
For those officials in advanced economies not currently pressed to the wall, the 
problems of their colleagues stand as a reminder.  In a world where there may be 
bounds on the government’s capacity to extract taxation from the economy, or where 
there is a large option value to being able to sharply ramp up debt in response to wars, 
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pandemics, or financial crises, officials may reasonably exhibit precautionary saving 
behavior in much the same way as that lauded among individuals.  As our paper 
emphasizes though, governments have many options for bringing down debts, not just 
tightening budgets, and when debt is high and rising, it is important for policymakers to 
be aware of the full range of options they can eventually choose from, both orthodox 
and heterodox.  
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Appendix A:  A chain-rule for the general government budget 
 
The IMF’s Fiscal Monitor (various) reports the general government budgets of advanced 
economies adjusted for a variety of influences.  These include the actual budget balance 
(ACT), the primary budget—or the actual budget less interest payments (PRI), and the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAP), which abstracts from both interest payments 
and the business cycle.  The latter captures the discretionary element of fiscal policy.  
For our purposes, it is clearer to deal with the three elements of the budget—
discretionary policy (DIS), interest payments (INT), and the cycle (CYC).  Consider chain 
linking what the IMF reports and what we prefer: 
 
ACT = CAP + (ACT −PRI) + (PRI −CAP), or 
 
ACT = DIS + INT + CYC. 
 
The latter is reported below for changes over two four-year windows, from 2007 to 
2010 and 2010 to 2013.   
 
 
Appendix:  Decomposition of the change in the general budget balance 
  from 2007 to 2010 from 2010 to 2013 
  Actual    Actual    
  Change Discretionary Change Discretionary 
Australia -6.5 -5.6 1.6 2.1 
Austria -3.5 -1.0 3.0 2.8 
Belgium -3.9 -2.8 1.3 1.5 
Canada -6.4 -4.6 1.9 1.3 
Czech Republic -4.0 -1.3 3.3 3.9 
Denmark -7.5 -5.2 1.9 1.4 
Finland -7.8 -3.0 0.4 1.1 
France -4.3 -2.2 2.6 2.4 
Germany -4.4 -2.9 4.4 3.5 
Greece -4.2 -0.6 7.8 11.3 
Hong Kong SAR -3.4 -3.0 -3.5 -1.9 
Iceland -15.5 -7.6 8.0 5.8 
Israel -3.4 -3.8 1.4 0.6 
Italy -2.8 -0.8 1.3 3.4 
Japan -7.2 -5.0 1.1 0.4 
Korea -0.6 -0.3 -0.9 -0.6 
Latvia -8.0 -1.6 6.2 2.6 
Luxembourg -4.4 -1.5 0.8 1.0 
Malta -1.2 -1.3 0.7 1.1 
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Netherlands -4.8 -3.1 2.4 3.8 
New Zealand -8.5 -7.1 4.4 4.2 
Norway -6.2 -1.0 -0.1 0.8 
Portugal -6.6 -5.6 4.9 8.4 
Singapore -5.3 -5.4 -0.9 -0.7 
Slovak Republic -5.7 -3.3 4.8 6.3 
Slovenia -5.5 -1.9 -8.6 3.9 
Spain1 -11.6 -8.2 2.5 5.3 
Sweden -3.6 -1.6 -1.3 -1.5 
Switzerland -1.2 -0.7 0.0 0.3 
United Kingdom -7.1 -2.2 4.1 3.5 
Source:  IMF, Fiscal Monitor (2014). 
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Appendix B:  Sensitivity of the interest rate to rare disaster probability with recursive 
utility 
 
In the text, we parameterize the effect of small changes in the probability of a rare 
disaster p on the expected rate of interest, using the model of Barro (2006) with 
isoelastic utility.  In this appendix, we follow the model of Barro (2009) and the 
parameterizations in Barro and Ursua (2012) to explore the more general case where 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion is not constrained to be the inverse of the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution.  We follow Barro (2009) who considers a variant 
of the Weil recursive utility function 
 
(A1)  1 (1 ) /(1 ) (1 ) /(1 )1(1 ) [(1 )(1 ) ] (1 )(1 )/{ }t t t tU C E U−θ −θ −γ −γ −θ+= −β + β −β − γ −β − γ  
 
where now γ is the coefficient of risk aversion and θ  is the inverse of the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution.  Assuming as before that rare disaster shocks lead to a 
permanent downward level shock in output, the equation for the short-term riskless 
expected real interest rate is now given by 
 
(A2)   
2 2
1
(1/ 2)( ) (1/ 2)
     ( 1) /( 1) (1 ) [( ) /( 1)] (1 )
r g
p p E b p E b−γ −γ
= ρ + θ + θ − γ ⋅σ − θ⋅ γ ⋅σ
+ ⋅ θ − γ − − ⋅ − + ⋅ γ − θ γ − ⋅ −
 
 
where we have set q = 0 since it has only a very minor effect.  Equation (A2) reduces to 
equation (1) of the text when γ = θ (the isoelastic case) and q = 0.  Drawing on estimates 
from Barro and Ursua (2012), the sum of the coefficients on p in equation (A2) is −1.54 if 
γ = 3, and is −3.26 if γ = 4.26  These estimates take θ = 2, σ = .02, g = .025 and ρ = .044.  It 
should be noted that Barro and Ursua (2012) use a lower threshold for rare disasters 
than Barro (2006) (10% instead of 15%), which raises the sample value of p to .0395. 
 
 In the extended model, the sensitivity of the short-term interest rate  p falls 
somewhat (from −5.3 to between −1.54  and −3.26), but the basic qualitative conclusion 
of the text proves robust: small changes in the perception of a rare disaster can 
significantly affect the expected interest rate.  Of course, the model does not allow for 
an explicitly time-varying disaster probability. For such an extension, see Wachter 
(2013), though since that model also gives a large effect on interest rates of a 
generalized rise in disaster probabilities, the basic insight should remain.  
 
                                                      
26 The sum of the coefficients on p in (A2) is given by  
1[( 1) /( 1) (1 ) [( ) /( 1)] (1 ) ]E b E b−γ −γθ − γ − − − + γ − θ γ − ⋅ − .  The authors are grateful to Robert 
Barro for providing the intermediate calculations based on the full distribution of disaster outcomes b 
necessary to calculate  the coefficients on p in equation (A2).  (The mean value of b is of course not 
sufficient since the equation is nonlinear in b.)   For more general output processes, see Nakamura et al. 
(2013). 
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